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ABSTRACT:  
Clinicians and laboratory scientists use a number of different systems for naming genetic 
mutations in their daily activities. Based on participant observation at an American academic 
medical center and interviews with a variety of actors at American hospitals, this paper analyzes 
the use of these systems. I argue that their distribution corresponds to differences in professional 
regimes of responsibility. An examination of these often quite complex linguistic items reveals a 
correlation between the type of components (evidential versus epistemic modifiers) that 
constitute the names and the presupposed professional role of their intended audiences. 
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Contemporary medical science asserts that genetics is implicated in almost all aspects of 
human health and disease (Nussbaum et al. 2016).1 Medical centers in the United States are 
rapidly incorporating genetic testing into their standard healthcare practices for a wide range of 
diagnostic purposes (Manolio et al. 2013). To provide a diagnosis, though, scientists and 
clinicians must collaborate in order to identify a particular genetic mutation as the candidate 
source of a patient’s disorder. They search for variation within an affected patient’s genetic code 
– in the form of both large structural differences in the chromosomes as well as small mutations 
of single nucleotides within a gene. The ability to identity disease is therefore becoming 
increasingly linked to medical professionals’ ability to locate and label different forms of genetic 
variation. 
The question of how to name such variation has harassed scientists since the earliest 
years of their forays into the analysis of such mutations (Shafeer et al. 2013). With disconnected 
genetics laboratories making separate – though occasionally simultaneous (Wain et al. 1999) – 
discoveries, unrelated and non-commensurate naming systems have arisen and come into 
competition (Halverson 2019). As genetics has increased in prominence, so too have concerns 
increased about the chaotic state of the existing systems (den Dunnen and Antonarakis 2000; 
Editorial 1997). However, “the issue is not a paucity of standards but, rather, too many to choose 
from” (Warner et al. 2016, 113). Today, there are as many as six major competing nomenclatures 
and many more minor or specialized systems that are used to label genetic variation (Shoenbill et 
al. 2014). In the hospital, one can hear professionals refer diversely to a unique individual 
mutation in a particular patient with multiple names, such as the likely pathogenic variant, 
PMP22, a 17p deletion, or one can read it printed on a laboratory report as c.434delT. 
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This seeming free variation of code choice struck me immediately at the onset of my 
fieldwork in a medical genetics clinic in the American Midwest, where I spent a year and two 
subsequent summers shadowing genetic counselors and other specialist clinicians, and working 
in a number of affiliated laboratories. I observed genetics talk in both the research setting among 
scientists and the healthcare delivery setting among practitioners. The specific clinic with which 
I was affiliated has the purpose of providing genetic tests for patients who have either a rare 
disease or an advanced cancer.2  
At first, the diversity of genetic nomenclatures seemed commensurate with the diversity 
of expert personnel with whom I interacted. However, the variation in naming practices has also 
repeatedly been brought to my attention by my clinician interlocutors. They are enthusiastic to 
theorize extemporaneously about the meanings, systematization, and complexity of the various 
systems. Many make comments about the outwardly random nature of both their and their 
coworkers’ choice of code. But, based on my observations, I argue that these folk intuitions 
result from the practitioners’ language ideological (Kroskrity 2000; Schieffelin et al. 2000) 
reduction of a name’s meaning to its referential function (Jakobson 1960; Silverstein 1976), that 
is, to its ability to pick out an individual genetic mutation. In this article, I present an analysis of 
how nomenclature systems are in fact much more regular and complex. I show that they track 
differences in professional regimes of responsibility and segregate according to the pragmatic 
demands of various medical contexts. I contend that what is seen as a sort of conceptual anarchy 
from the perspective of reference looks much more orderly from the perspective of indexicality. 
In what follows, I link morphological segments of gene names to sociological systems of 
expertise and professional responsibility. The same gene has different aspects of its manifold 
existence described by different types of names. In particular, this paper focuses on segments of 
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names that convey meanings about the evidence and certitude with which a genetic mutation is 
described. Classic works in the sociology of knowledge production (Latour and Woolgar 1979; 
Latour 1987) contend that a scientific claim becomes increasingly “factual” as “modalities” –
 hedging, modulation, qualification, etcetera – are removed from its linguistic representation. 
Departing from these analyses, I argue that it is not merely that modalities are removed. Rather, I 
demonstrate that – following Michael Silverstein (2003b) – the information conveyed by gene 
names is transduced, changing in content and structure in some salient ways while maintaining 
the appearance of identity as it moves between alternative systems of representation.3 As a 
gene’s name is transduced across systems used by different classes of medical personnel, some 
information is lost while other information is gained. Moreover, I demonstrate that 
nomenclatural differentiation has more to do with the social and professional roles of the users of 
those systems than it does with perceptions and projections of “facticity.” By attending to the 
social identities of the users of the different nomenclature systems, we can see the relationship 
between the linguistic presentation of evidence and the sociological ascription of expertise. In 
what follows, we will see how language practice corresponds to different professional regimes of 
responsibility in the practice of medical genetics.  
I argue that a combination of the imagined capacities of professional interlocutors and the 
goals of specific encounters determine an actor’s use of nomenclature system. I contend that this 
hinges particularly on the morphological structures employed by each system. That is, the 
morphological components that constitute gene and mutation names correlate with the 
professional roles and responsibilities presupposed of their intended contexts of use (Silverstein 
2003a). The variable social values of the professional classes are reflected in the manners in 
which these classificational acts are undertaken (cf. Mauss and Durkheim 1963). I focus 
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particularly on the use of evidential and epistemic markers (cf. Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003; 
Aikhenvald 2004; Chafe and Nichols 1986) in these naming practices.  
In brief, by evidential marker, I refer to a component of a gene or mutation name that 
details the means by which it has been discovered to exist – which test methodology has been 
used. By epistemic marker, I refer to a component of a name that evaluates the likelihood that 
that gene or mutation does in fact exist and is not merely an artifact of the technology used for its 
discovery. In this paper, I demonstrate that these two categories correspond to varying levels of 
ascribed scientific expertise: Evidential markers are used with expert audiences, while the use of 
epistemic markers tracks primarily with a relative professional distance from such realms of 
knowledge-production and interpretation. 
The use of this kind of linguistic marking in scientific discourse has typically been 
analyzed – with limited morphological specificity – under the broad rubric of “hedges” (Hobbs 
2003; Prince et al. 1982; Salager-Meyer 1994; Varttala 1999; see also Lakoff 1972, 195 for a 
discussion of hedging in general). This literature describes hedges variously as minimizing the 
threat to a speaker’s face, as a politeness strategy, and as (only occasionally) a qualification of a 
proposition’s accuracy (e.g. Salanger-Meyer 1994, 153). Such hedging has been found to be a 
common feature of academic and medical discourse in general (Crismore and Farnsworth 1990). 
Despite that, an examination of such linguistic practices with regard to the astoundingly complex 
ecology of genetic nomenclatures has been missing. 
In order to fill this gap, I begin my analysis with an overview of medical genetics as a site 
of occasionally agonistic social life. I then turn to consider the ways scholars have described 
evidential and epistemic markers in scientific and vernacular language. Next, I provide an 
overview of the professional practices and actors who cross paths in the Department of Medical 
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Genetics at the Midwestern hospital at which I worked. Thereafter I analyze, in some detail, five 
competing and interacting systems of nomenclature used at different stages in the process of 
genetic testing. I specifically describe their use of evidential and epistemic markers and 
demonstrate the motivated relationship between these morphemes and the contexts in which the 
different systems are used. Finally, I conclude by analyzing the way the systems segregate and 
interact, demonstrating the relationship between expertise and evidential markers. In this way, 
drawing on the concepts of evidentiality and epistemic modality allows us to see the pragmatic 
rationale behind the confusing system of genetic nomenclatures.  
 
Sociology of Medical Genetics 
The primary contrast that my interlocutors make in the professional regimes of medical 
genetics is between research and therapy. Laboratory scientists and clinicians have distinct roles 
in academic medical centers, operating under different paradigms of professional responsibility 
(Beauchamp and Saghai 2012). Roughly put, the scientists with whom I have worked are 
relatively more interested in genetic test results insofar as they constitute generalizable 
knowledge about populations. They are also more critical of purported findings at the genotypic 
level, in terms of a test’s ability to detect a mutation in the first instance. They consider whether 
and how well a particular test methodology can identify a particular type of mutation. On the 
other hand, my clinician interlocutors are responsible for determining how a result might inform 
the treatment of an individual patient in their care. They are more concerned with genetic 




Along this dimension from laboratory to clinic, professional authority is granted 
incrementally over abstract and experimental knowledge-production toward one pole, and 
practical therapeutic intervention toward the other. Of course, reality is more complicated than 
this simple model suggests; hybrid clinician–scientists are common figures in the Department of 
Medical Genetics. Many of the laboratory heads with whom I have worked also hold medical 
doctorates, and many of the specialist clinicians collaborate intimately with laboratories in their 
research. In fact, that these two worlds collide is the very reason the practice is referred to as 
“translational medicine” in the first place (Mankoff et al. 2004): translating theory into practice. 
The Department of Medical Genetics stands as a sort of “trading zone” (Galison 1999), a site of 
conjuncture between two different professional paradigms. Clinicians and scientists bring with 
them different goals and different vocabularies, but in this shared space, they work together to 
bridge these ontological gaps. 
Nonetheless, a clear division of clinic and laboratory is the ideological construct that 
structures interaction and undergirds local imaginations of professional roles. Characteristic 
comments from scientists on the topic include statements such as “I’m not sure all clinicians 
have a deep enough understanding of genetics […] and how to use that information 
appropriately,” and “I’m not sure that any of us understand the nuances of [clinical] practice.” In 
interviews, clinicians have expressed parallel anxieties: that the laboratory scientists struggle to 
understand the medical reasons for ordering a test, and that they as clinicians do not have the 
expertise needed to scrutinize the applicability of the various methodologies and algorithms used 





Transducing Evidence for Non-Experts 
When scientists and clinicians talk about nomenclature systems, they characterize the 
labels and descriptions of genetic mutations as “names.” While these names point to the same 
individual genetic variation, they typify it in different ways, according to the grammar of the 
given system. As my interlocutors in the clinic consider the words and phrases used in genetic 
nomenclatures to be names of these variants, they ignore the heteroglot circumstances in which 
they find themselves (Bakhtin 1981). Especially for clinicians, it seems that the different systems 
blend into each other in their emic representation of the total linguistic system. They do not 
always recognize how one name differs from another, nor can they necessarily determine to 
which system a name belongs. “It’s really confusing,” a pathologist warned me when I began my 
research into this topic. Even in discussions with highly respected experts, my linguistic 
examples often met surprise and self-contradiction. When they learned about my interests, many 
of my interviewees asked me, non-rhetorically, “Why do people call genes so many different 
things?” In this way, the discreteness of the nomenclatures and their systematicity can sit below 
users’ limits of awareness with regards to their own language practices (Silverstein 2001). 
Specifically, my interlocutors reduce the functions of the names to their referential values, 
equating a single word with a single object, as different ways of saying the same thing. In this 
manner, they erase the meaningful distinctions in what the different systems communicate, 
which provides the background for local confusion over the seeming randomness of code choice. 
Moreover, for many of my clinician interlocutors, it is not even apparent that these ‘names’ can 
encode anything other than a transparent reference to a discrete genetic mutation. While they 
certainly know that other systems exist – and that those systems are used vaguely “in the lab,” as 
I was told when I first arrived at my field site, standing as a sort of second-order indexicality 
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(Johnstone, Andrus and Danielson 2006; Silverstein 2003a) – the possibility that they can relate 
something other than merely greater genotypic specificity is often not clear to them. In what 
follows, I attend to the features of the nomenclature systems that in this ideology are ignored in 
order to demonstrate the pragmatic differences between them. 
I follow a number of linguists (e.g., Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003; Aikhenvald 2004; de 
Haan 1999; Michael 2012; Speas 2008) in making a categorical distinction between evidentiality 
and epistemic modality in my analysis of genetic nomenclatures. This contrasts with much of the 
discussion of “evidentiality” in English and scientific discourse, in which scholars either conflate 
the two functions or leave them in an ambiguous relationship (e.g., Atkinson 1999; Hobbs 2003; 
Prince, Frader and Bosk 1982). It is not that they do so without reason: Distinctions between the 
two functions are difficult to ascertain in languages such as English, in which they are not rigidly 
segregated or obligatorily marked (Fox 2001). In fact, some languages conflate the two in a 
single grammatical category (e.g., Cheyenne, see Murray 2017) or correlate the two forms of 
meaning in invariant ways (e.g., Kashaya, see Chafe and Nichols 1986, 43). However, I 
demonstrate that a strong distinction represents the semantic reality of the particular 
nomenclatures I analyze in this article, and I furthermore argue that this distinction correlates 
with the social contexts in which the nomenclatures are deployed. As such, it behooves us to 
consider in more detail what is meant by the two terms when they are kept distinct. 
Alexandra Aikhenvald, in her classic introduction to the topic, defines evidential markers 
as those grammatical elements that express “a source of evidence for some information” 
(Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003, 1). In the current article, it is particularly relevant that evidential 
markers can specify the type of evidence used to back up an assertion. In more prototypical cases 
from linguistics, this includes marking whether a proposition is based on hearsay, inference, or 
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eyewitness, among other things. In the systems of nomenclature I discuss below, evidential 
markers signal, e.g., which type of test has been used to assert the existence of a particular 
genetic variant.  
In order to distinguish epistemic modality from evidentiality, epistemic markers have 
been defined as those grammatical elements that express “the degree of commitment on the part 
of the speaker for his or her utterance” (de Haan 1999, 84). Thus, while evidential markers are 
assertions of source, epistemic markers are evaluations of reliability or confidence. Epistemic 
marking in genetic nomenclature systems signals, e.g., the modulation of certainty that a 
mutation exists or that it causes a particular disease.  
Scholars of science and technology (e.g., Latour and Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987) have 
discussed similar phenomena in scientific fact-making under the rubric of “modalities,” 
qualifications about the specific circumstances under which a statement was constructed. These 
scholars argue that greater facticity is achieved by removing modalities from statements aspiring 
to be facts. In what follows, however, I argue that linguistic attention to the actual appearance 
and use of these “modalities” demonstrates a more complicated sociology of knowledge and 
knowledge production. In the practice of medical genetics, epistemic and evidential markers in 
genetic names illuminate the different types of expertise at play in the various contexts where 
clinicians and researchers interact. 
 
Transductional Medicine: From Laboratory to Clinic 
Genetic mutations receive their names through the process of genetic testing. The point of 
conducting a genetic test at my field site is first and foremost to provide a patient with a 
diagnosis. Both clinicians and scientists generally assume either that for the majority of patients, 
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disease is caused by a single genetic mutation, or that genetic testing is not yet advanced enough 
to be able to interpret the intersecting consequences of multiple genetic abnormalities. 
(Sometimes clinicians put forward both of these assumptions at once, and many times they do 
not explicitly distinguish between the two possibilities.) Therefore, clinicians and scientists focus 
on finding a single variant in the patient’s genetic code that could be responsible for his or her 
bad health. I refer to this as the presumption of a single unified cause.  
Because of the relative novelty of both the science of genetics and its medical 
implementation, it only occasionally proves diagnostically successful for the patients at this 
specific clinic. A contemporary report from an unrelated institution demonstrated a 25% success 
rate in diagnosing patients using similar genetic tests (Yang 2014). This percentage is roughly 
analogous to the success of my interlocutors in determining the cause of an undiagnosed rare 
disease. If a diagnosis can be established, it is hoped that testing will also lead clinicians to a 
recommendation for a new or modified therapeutic regimen. The likelihood of this is, of course, 
even smaller than that of an initial diagnosis. (It is critical to note that the ‘success’ of genetic 
testing has nothing to do with the patient’s actual health outcome but rather only with the test’s 
ability to provide evidence in support of a diagnosis or treatment. That is, a patient can succumb 
to cancer while still being considered a success if testing reveals a new or more specific 
diagnosis.) 
The divergent professional responsibilities of laboratory scientists and clinicians fall 
along these lines: Scientists are motivated to conduct genetic tests in order to discover new 
genotype–phenotype correlations and diagnoses relevant to a broad population. Clinicians, on the 
other hand, are primarily interested in genetic testing because of its ability to aid in 
prognostication and therapy for individual patients.  
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Among scientists, comments about genetic findings such as “We don’t feel it’s clinically 
relevant; it’s just for academic interest” can spark long conversations about the implications of 
the finding for generalizable genetic knowledge. Contrarily, when such “academic” concerns are 
raised in front of clinicians, they are regularly shut down in favor of issues with clear therapeutic 
value. For instance, two scientists at an interdisciplinary conference began discussing a particular 
patient’s mutation that one of them had dubbed “interesting from a biology point of view, but 
nothing clinically actionable.” The leader of the meeting, a clinician, quickly interrupted: “Folks, 
we’ve only got a few minutes left for this case.” 
The two broad professional classes also differ in terms of their role in engaging reported 
genetic variants. One of the primary concerns for laboratory scientists is to determine whether a 
certain variant reported by a machine is “real” – that is, whether it actually exists in the patient’s 
genome or whether its report is simply the result of a computational error. Contrarily, the 
primary concern for clinicians is to determine whether a reported variant could in fact cause the 
particular medical problems the patient is experiencing. 
The various systems of nomenclature used in the laboratory thus encode information 
relevant to the determination of whether a variant is “real,” while those used on the clinical side 
encode more information used to determine the likelihood that a variant causes disease. As the 
results from the tests circulate and accumulate medical interpretations, they change in form in 
order to bear (only) that information relevant to their rotating audiences. The semantic 
information encoded in the names is ‘transduced’ (Silverstein 2003b), changing in content and 
structure in some salient ways while maintaining the appearance of identity. And yet, the 
information load is not simply reduced, and it is not simply reformulated. Information that was 
once salient stands only as noise to a new audience and is therefore sloughed off. At the same 
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time, information that would not have been relevant to the previous audience is added for the 
benefit of the new audience. Both addition and reduction are important to the role of the 
transduction of genetic information as it is transposed into different nomenclature systems. 
Rather than as pure and transparent representations of genotypic information, I argue that 
the classificational work of these nomenclature systems is motivated by the social 
meaningfulness of the variants within particular branches of contemporary medical genetics. 
This argument builds on work in the social studies of science (Bowker and Star 1999; Hacking 
1986; Lampland and Star 2009; Star and Griesemer 1989) about how social and historical 
contexts structure such systems in ways that supersede transparent representation. In fact, some 
of the systems – especially those used by clinicians – work more to “facilitate action” rather than 
to “advance understanding” regarding the variants to which they refer (contra Mauss and 
Durkheim 1963, 81). 
 
Sociolinguistic Overview 
Having laid out the setting of the clinic at which I worked and briefly described the 
professional roles of the key classes of actors, I now return to the question of genetic 
nomenclatures. Below I analyze five prominent methods for referring to genetic mutations used 
in the clinic at which I conducted my fieldwork. Some of these systems create incredibly 
morphologically complex ‘names,’ while others yield quite simple results. Some names are 
‘pronounceable’ and useful in verbal exchange, while others can only appear in written form. In 
order to understand how these systems relate to one another, some further information is also 
provided about the process of genetic testing itself. I roughly follow the actual chronology of the 
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test, beginning with the representation of the lowest-level or smallest-scale results from a 
laboratory test and progressing to the form in which those results are returned in the clinic. 
 
I. FASTQ Nomenclature 
 In order to be sequenced, scientists extract DNA from a sample of a patient’s blood or 
other tissue. The DNA is chemically “amplified” – producing thousands or millions of copies in 
order for the sequencing machine to “read” the DNA more easily and more accurately. 
Amplification requires that the strings of DNA be fragmented into segments of approximately 
100 pairs of molecules called nucleotides – cytosine, guanine, adenine, and thymine (or C, G, A, 
and T, respectively). The duplicated segments are then reassembled according to the similarity of 
a particular segment’s sequence to the “reference genome,” a digital collection of DNA from 
multiple individuals considered to represent a “healthy” genotype. For many reasons, including 
the fact that this reassembly is not always perfect, the process can result in the emergence of 
errors in the reported sequence. The nucleotides assembled at a particular location do not 
necessarily represent the nucleotides at that location within the patient’s actual genome. 
 In order to make this genetic information discrete and legible, an algorithm transforms it 
into a FASTQ text file.4 An example of a segment of DNA represented in FASTQ nomenclature 
is presented in (1a-d) below. 
 (1a) @EAS139:136:FC706VJ:2:5:1000:12850 1:Y:18:ATCACG 
 (1b) GATTTGGGGTTCAAAGCAGTATCGATCAAATAG 
 (1c) + 
 (1d) h<BBCCCC?<A?BC?7@@@@@@DBBA@@@@A@@ 
Each DNA segment is given a particular sequence identifier, presented in the first line of the 
item (1a) following the at sign <@>. The second line (1b) consists of the actual sequence of 
nucleotides in the segment, represented by their abbreviations: A, C, T, G. This is called the 
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“short read,” as it merely represents a segment of DNA, or “read.” The third line (1c) always 
only contains a plus sign <+>, connecting the read with the “quality score” in the fourth line (1d). 
The quality score is made up of a number of characters equal to that of the short read, with each 
nucleotide paired with one of 93 ASCII characters. The quality-score character denotes the 
statistical probability that the nucleotide represented in the short read actually exists as such in 
the patient’s physical DNA sequence. The probability is determined based on the number of 
reassembled reads at a given location in the genome. The nucleotides with the lowest probability 
of existing are represented by non-alphanumeric characters, while those with the highest 
likelihood are represented by miniscule alphabetic characters. Thus, the first nucleotide in (1) is 
quite likely (h) to be truly a guanine molecule (G), while the second nucleotide is much less 
likely (<) to be an adenine molecule (A) – though it is still more likely to be adenine than any of 
the other three nucleotides. 
 FASTQ nomenclature therefore inflects two points of information: specific nucleotide (the 
short read, line 1b) and epistemic status (the quality score, line 1d). Scientists consult the FASTQ 
file in order to review the fine-grained epistemic information it encodes. If a mutation is selected 
subsequently as a candidate cause for a patient’s disorder, scientists can assure themselves that it 
is reasonably certain to exist by referring back to its FASTQ notation. One cancer biologist put it 
this way to me: “I would only look at [FASTQ] data if I am doubting what a coworker is doing 
with their interpretation.” 
 
II. VCF Nomenclature 
While most genetic nomenclature systems appear complex to both novices and experts 
alike, FASTQ is particularly arcane. Most human actors involved in genetic testing never or only 
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rarely refer to the FASTQ file; instead they encounter the genetic information in a more 
accessible (and more derived) form. After its FASTQ instantiation as bare code, genetic 
information is transduced into the Variant Call Format (VCF) by a computer algorithm.5 (A “call” 
is the term for the proposal that a specific nucleotide has been found at a given location in a 
patient’s genome.)  
The FASTQ format conveys every nucleotide that has been sequenced, even those 
variants that match the reference genome and are thus considered healthy and not candidate 
causes for a patient’s disorder. The VCF file, on the other hand, consists of a representation of 
only those genetic variants that differ from the reference genome. Thus, the VCF file is in part a 
reduced version of the FASTQ file, making it more legible to audiences that are less expert in 
genetic science.  
Yet, as a laboratory scientist told me, the VCF format is still “generally unintelligible to 
the general population,” meaning clinicians – who are not its intended audience. Clinicians 
regularly call VCF files “raw data,” as they are the first and most complex forms of genetic 
information that they typically encounter. I have, however, found some discrepancy in what 
counts as “raw data.” As a scientist explained, “it means different things to different people.” For 
clinicians, “raw data” refers to the VCF file, that is, to only those segments of DNA that differ 
from the healthy reference genome and thus are potential sources of a patient’s disease. 
Laboratory scientists, on the other hand, scoff at labeling the VCF file “raw data,” as it is already 
much reduced and reformatted (thus not “raw”) from the FASTQ format presented above. 
That said, the VCF file is not simply a reduced version of FASTQ; the information it 
presents is both reordered and supplemented. An interlinear gloss of an exemplary VCF name is 
given in (2): 
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(2)  chr17   43094464  rs1799950  A   G   29    PASS  DP=100 
 CHROM POS  ID    REF ALT QUAL  FILT INFO 
‘Mutation from A to G on chromosome 17 at position 43094464, uniquely identified 
in dbSNP6 as “rs1799950,” called with high (29) certainty after having passed all 
filters, and with 100 reads covering this locus.” 
 
For the purposes of this article, it is important to note three key features of the VCF name. First, 
it only contains information regarding variation from the reference genome. Based on 
contemporary statistics, any given human being’s DNA is said to differ by merely 0.1% from the 
reference genome. Thus, a VCF file covers only a minute fraction of a patient’s complete 
sequence of nucleotides. It is much reduced in the information it bears. 
Second, VCF names continue to exhibit the epistemic status of a particular nucleotide 
called at a particular location in the genome – giving it an explicit “quality score,” as in the 
FASTQ format. However, VCF names additionally provide a second marker – namely, the 
number of reads at a particular location (termed the “DP” or “combined depth across samples”). 
As the reader will recall, the more reads of the amplified DNA that return a particular nucleotide 
at a particular location, the greater the likelihood that this “call” does indeed accurately reflect 
the molecular reality of the particular sequence.  
An understanding of how to convert “depth” into probability allows scientists to judge 
the reliability of the whole call. In general, a score between 30 and 50 reads at a particular 
location is considered an average return for a test. A score of 100 reads, as indicated in (2), is 
considered high. The DP segment thus represents a midway point between evidential and 
epistemic functions. While the pragmatic role for its inclusion in the name is to allow the reader 
to form a judgment about likelihood, it does not explicitly encode this information. The score has 
a conventional implicature (Grice 1989) of corresponding probability, but it requires some 
awareness and expertise in order to reach that pragmatic conclusion. An expert’s interpretation 
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of the DP segment coupled with the overt epistemic content borne by the quality score 
determines the confidence with which the call will be mobilized in clinical care.  
Finally, the ID segment provides the first link between genotypic and phenotypic data. 
While not explicit in the VCF name itself, this unique identifier allows the reader to discover 
more medically relevant information about the variant. The ID can be entered into an online 
database in order to discover a mutation’s “clinical significance.” (In the above example, the 
database suggests that the variant is of uncertain clinical significance, but that it is located in a 
gene associated with breast cancer. Such data typically leads clinicians to propose further testing 
in order to determine whether any link exists between the particular variant and the genetic 
process that leads to the associated disease.) Thus, the VCF name begins to be relevant to the 
professional responsibilities of clinicians as well as to those of scientists. 
 
III. Cytogenetic Nomenclature 
 The first two systems of nomenclature are used specifically with genetic sequencing, in 
which information is captured at the molecular level in the form of data about individual 
nucleotides and their ordering. Many genetic tests, however, work at a larger scale, looking 
instead at structural variation in chromosomes. In these instances, genetic variation is labeled 
using cytogenetic nomenclature. A standardized form of this system was first proposed in 1960 
at a conference of genetic researchers (Robinson 1960). It underwent a number of subsequent 
changes over the next several years before coming under the jurisdiction of the newly formed 
International Standing Committee on Human Cytogenetic Nomenclature in 1976 (Shaffer et al. 
2013, 15). The following year, the Committee produced the first complete system of 
nomenclature, called the International System for Human Cytogenetic Nomenclature (ISCN), a 
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system that (although since modified multiple times) is still used in contemporary naming 
practices. Unlike the systems studied in much earlier scholarship on classification (e.g., Lévi-
Strauss 1962; Mauss and Durkheim 1963), genetic nomenclatures are not implicitly but rather 
explicitly developed and refined through reflective consensus for the purpose of addressing the 
social needs of their users, within their particular social contexts. Because of its origin, the ISCN 
system is particularly tailored to laboratory work and circulates primarily among cytogeneticists, 
scientists who study the structure and abnormalities of chromosomes. An interlinear gloss of a 
cytogenetic name is given in (3). 
 (3) 46,   XX  .ish  ins(15;17) (q22;q21q21) (PML+,RARA+RARA+) 
  CHROM SEX METHOD TYPE  LOCATION PROBES 
‘An insertion of the segment 17q21 from the long arm (q) of chromosome 17 into the 
15q22 band of the long arm of chromosome 15, identified with probes for PML and 
RARA genes and using the chemical methodology of in-situ hybridization (ish).’ 
 
Of particular interest to the analysis at hand is that cytogenetic nomenclature provides 
both a chromosome- and a gene-scale representation of the mutation. In (3) the mutation 
described exists in an individual with 46 chromosomes (“normal”) and two X chromosomes 
(“normal female”). While this information is of little salience in determining the effects or 
location of the specific mutation, it provides a “global” context with which the mutation could 
interact. For instance, if the number of chromosomes or combination of sex chromosomes is 
atypical, one cytogeneticist explained to me, she would likely expect the specific mutation to be 
related to this abnormality. This is a part of the presumption of a single unified cause, as 
described above. If the chromosomes are disordered in some way, a scientist will anticipate that 
this genotypic disorder will prove the cause of the patient’s disease at the phenotypic scale as 
well. If the reported mutation is unrelated to the chromosome number, suspicions will be raised 
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as to the validity of the test. That is, if the disease is not related to a chromosomal abnormality, 
scientists may suspect that the reported chromosomal abnormality is artefactual rather than real. 
The cytogenetic name describes a relatively more specific location of the mutation as 
well. It notates which chromosomes and which arms of those chromosomes are implicated in the 
mutation. For instance, in (3) there is an insertion of a segment of the long arm (q) of 
chromosome 17 into a segment of the long arm of chromosome 15. Thus, the name details 
information both about the “global” context of ambient features such as chromosome number as 
well as about the “local” context of the specific mutation. 
Cytogenetic names are not complete without the addition of markers indicating evidential 
support for the mutation’s presupposed existence. Scientists consider certain methodologies to be 
unreliable or below the standard of practice. For example, certain methodologies are known to be 
unable to recognize particular types of genetic segments. That knowledge can lead scientists to 
dismiss such results outright, calling them “not real.” The markers denoting the probes 
(molecules used to detect specific segments of DNA) and methodology used in the test can 
provide the astute scientist with data by which to judge whether the mutation under consideration 
should be reported to clinicians as the candidate cause of a patient’s disorder.  
For example, one cytogeneticist described a case in which a test had suggested a patient 
had DiGeorge syndrome, a disease caused by a genetic deletion on chromosome 22 and 
associated with heart defects and many other medical issues. Upon reviewing the report, 
however, he noticed that the evidence denoted in the mutation’s cytogenetic name did not 
conform with what he had expected. The information about the probes (disclosed as evidential 
markers) was atypical for what he as an expert knew about the methodology by which this 
particular mutation was normally discovered. “I was worried it could be an indication of failed 
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hybridization,” he told me. After redoing the test, he discovered that the reported mutation did 
not exist in the patient’s actual genome, and in fact a completely different mutation was the true 
cause of the patient’s symptoms.  
On the other hand, a different laboratory scientist described a contrary case of unexpected 
evidential markers. During his graduate training, this young man had come across a probe 
(evidential) marker that did not match his expectations for the particular test results. He decided 
to run the test a second time. “It was good to re-check,” he noted, “to be sure the region [of the 
chromosome] was well captured and well covered” by the test, but in the end, he discovered that 
the first test had in fact been accurate. He attributed his misinterpretation to his youthful 
inexpertness and lack of “connoisseurship,” in his own words, which he stressed is necessary for 
making these kinds of discriminations. This case demonstrates the cancelability of the epistemic 
implications of these evidential markers (cf. Speas 2008), further underscoring the important 
distinction between the two linguistic functions. 
Scientific articles may begin by using the full cytogenetic name of a mutation under 
discussion. Thereafter, authors typically switch to a “shorthand” or abbreviated form, which 
points back anaphorically to the specificity of the referent provided by the full cytogenetic name. 
Thus scientists and clinicians say things such as “He has a 17p deletion,” or “The test confirms 
t(11;14).”7 That is, the location information is reformatted to demonstrate only on which arm – 
long (q) or short (p) – of which chromosome the mutation is found, rather than the highly 
specific location information encoded in the full name. The mutation type – typically a deletion, 
duplication, insertion, or translocation – is spoken either in full or using the abbreviation. These 
names do not convey all potentially salient information that a test has provided. For instance, 
they fail to denote the evidential information presented in the full cytogenetic name. These 
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abbreviated forms are the most common in the regular PowerPoint presentations of a patient’s 
case to interdisciplinary audiences of specialists. 
As with the VCF nomenclature, the morphological complexity of cytogenetic names 
means that they are not necessarily transparent in their meaning, even for specialists. For 
instance, while discussing nomenclature systems with me, one cytogeneticist admitted that she 
did not know what the methodology marker “enh” means. She then retrieved a copy of the 2013 
edition of the ISCN handbook in order to look it up. “Here, enhanced, oh!” she said when 
arriving at the appropriate page. “Enhanced fluorescence. Okay, I haven’t seen that one [before]. 
So it’s talking about enhanced fluorescence and that methodology.” She admitted that unless 
pressed, she would have passed over the marker without attempting to decipher it. Not all 
markers are important for sufficient comprehension; they become salient due to context. 
However, because of the rules of syntax in these names, she could tell by its position that enh 
must denote the form of methodology used to discover the mutation (that is, that it was an 
evidential marker). Knowing what part of the name on which to concentrate, she said, “would 
depend on what you’re looking at. [...] It would depend on what abnormality you’re looking for.” 
Scientists use systems like cytogenetic nomenclature because they are particularly 
interested in coming to conclusions about a reported mutation’s existence. The use of evidential 
markers, as we have seen, allows such experts to make these determinations based on epistemic 
implicatures specific to their expert subculture. This calls to mind Susan Philips’s (Philips 1992) 
discussion of the variability of “evidentiary standards” within the American legal system. The 
interpretations – and thus utility – of different forms of evidence are dependent on the 
presuppositions about their reliability as espoused by their professional groups.  
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The epistemic implicatures of these evidential markers only arise for a group of experts 
with scientific background knowledge about the relationship between test methodologies and the 
types of results they can and cannot produce. For instance, certain methodologies used in 
particular tests can be conventionally interpreted by experts to qualify the likelihood that a result 
is accurate. Because a scientist knows that, as noted above, a particular probe is incapable of 
reading a given mutation, that scientist may dismiss the report of such a mutation by that type of 
probe. The evidential marker describing the probe does not in itself or abstractly suggest that the 
result is unlikely; only in the particular context does it imply as much. Thus an evidential marker 
of how the result was found (what methodology) can be mobilized for epistemic purposes 
(confidence). Interactionally, the evidential can carry epistemic weight (Fox 2001; Kärkkäinen 
2003). 
However, again, these epistemic implicatures are cancelable because a result can still be 
considered “real” even if it does not match the expert’s evidential expectations. For example, in 
the case of the graduate student discussed above, the scientist initially discredited a result but 
upon further scrutiny, he realized the result was in fact accurate. The epistemic implicature he 
had attributed to the evidential marker (probe type) was canceled and he returned to assuming 
that the report represented his patient’s genetic reality. That is, the result was based on an 
unexpected methodology but it was still considered valid. 
 
IV. Symbols 
Clinicians, with their limited scientific expertise and greater interest in the care of 
individual patients, have much less use for evidential markers and for the related question of the 
existence of genetic mutations. More relevant for clinicians is the relationship of a genetic 
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mutation to the presentation of a disease. In order to explore this, I now turn to the most common 
nomenclature system employed in the Department of Medical Genetics, and the system that is 
most regularly used in verbal communication. This system consists of so-called “gene symbols.” 
Such symbols include lexical items such as APOE4, EGFR, and BRCA1.8 These names are 
spoken in case conferences and in “drive-by” consultations, they are written in articles, and some 
laboratory reports meant for patient readers use them as well. Symbols are relatively analytic or 
motivated, in that the letters that compose them often derive from the names of their gene 
products or the names of the diseases that they affect or effect. For instance, APOE4 produces 
apolipoprotein E, and EGFR produces the EGFR protein, or epidermal growth factor receptor. 
(Symbols are traditionally italicized in print in order to distinguish the names of genes from the 
names of their products.) BRCA1 is understood to be a major cause of breast cancer, hence its 
name relates to an even more derived or distal product of the gene. Many other genes – such as 
PARK2 (Parkinson’s disease), CFTR (cystic fibrosis), and PGL2 (paraganglioma, a rare type of 
tumor) – follow this scheme as well. In fact, as early as 1979 the Human Genome Organization 
officially recommended that “the name of the gene should describe the function of the enzyme” 
which it encodes (Wain et al. 1999, 162).9  
Gene symbols are by far the most morphologically simple of the nomenclature systems, 
and semantically they appear relatively indeterminate. They are short, easily memorized, and 
quickly spoken – characteristics that promote their use in all forms of communication. Most 
important for clinicians is the explicit link they provide to their associated phenotypes. For 
clinicians, the utility of genetic testing is to determine potential healthcare interventions. 
Knowing a patient has a BRCA mutation, a clinician can immediately suspect breast cancer, or 
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hearing that a RET mutation has been found, an oncologist can recommend an inhibitor to stymy 
the mutated production of the RET enzyme.  
However, symbols convey very little information. They merely demonstrate the gene in 
which a mutation exists rather than the specific variation it entails (which is what all the 
previously described systems of nomenclature do). Symbols’ referents remain vague relative to 
the specificity provided by (and in fact required of) genetic testing. These names clearly do not 
convey all potentially salient information that a test has provided. For instance, they fail to 
describe what specific nucleotides are affected by the mutation they name. (Genes can be 
thousands – sometimes even millions – of nucleotides long.) There are also no evidential or 
epistemic markers. Symbols simply take the accuracy of the test result and the existence of the 
mutation for granted. They are facts without Latourian “modalities.” 
While symbols like BRCA can refer to classes or types of genes – that is, the gene as it 
exists abstractly as a feature of all human genomes – in actual interaction, clinicians use symbols 
to pick out a particular mutation within a particular patient’s genome. Thus, when a clinician 
says, “The patient tested positive for BRCA,” he or she is clearly not saying (merely) that the 
patient has a BRCA gene, but that the patient has one of a closed number of pathogenic mutations 
within that gene. The form is noticeably underspecified in that it does not in itself provide 
enough information to describe a unique individual mutation; however, it nonetheless acts as a 
name to refer to such an individual, rather than to a class. (Such specificity could be provided 
through the prior mention – either verbal or written – of a morphologically more complex name 
for the mutation.)  
Certain gene symbols, like BRCA1 and BRCA2, can be reduced to just their alphabetic 
portions. BRCA can refer equally to either gene, despite the former being located on chromosome 
 
 26 
13 and the latter on chromosome 17 – and despite their producing totally different proteins. The 
genes are merely united in their eponymous link to breast cancer. This set of symbols therefore 
takes on a classificatory quality, not denoting a uniform segment of genetic material or its 
proximate gene products, but rather denoting the disease states associated with the genes. That is 
to say, such gene symbols are motivated primarily by their clinical relevance. Their ability to 
represent a variant’s social meaningfulness supersedes their ability to represent its genotypic 
specificity. As one clinician told me, “The value [of a genetic result] isn’t the raw data. It’s what 
the result says; it’s what it means.” The purpose of naming the result in the first place, in her 
opinion, was to demonstrate its relevance to clinical care. 
 
V. Descriptions 
Finally, I turn to the system that my clinician interlocutors most commonly refer to as 
“calls.” In this article, however, I prefer to adopt the term “descriptions,” which I take from the 
genetics literature. I use description in place of the favored local term in order to avoid confusion 
with the homonym call (described above), which refers to the scientist’s proposal that a 
particular nucleotide exists at a specific location in a patient’s genome. In contrast to this kind of 
call’s scientific interest in a mutation’s existence, descriptions are used when no genotypic 
information is required by the communicative situation. That is, descriptions encode only 
phenotypic information, clinical information about the likelihood that a particular mutation 
causes disease. The fact that clinicians refer to this system as “calls” betrays a locally imagined 
parallel between the scientist’s role in asserting a mutation’s existence (what one might 
distinguish as a scientific call) and the clinician’s role in asserting its link to disease (that is, a 
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clinical call). Because of their focus on phenotype, descriptions are the system preferred by 
clinicians in the Department of Medical Genetics. 
Common descriptions used at the clinic under discussion include, for instance, the likely 
benign variant and the variant of uncertain significance. Descriptions explicitly encode 
epistemic information with modifiers such as likely and uncertain. What these epistemic markers 
qualify is the proposed link between genotype (mutation) and phenotype (disease). They do not 
qualify the likelihood that the named mutation exists in the first instance.  
Systems of descriptions vary in localized fashion, in a dialect-like distribution across 
different institutions and laboratories. Typologically, they all constitute their names along two 
axes, namely, pathogenicity and certainty. (See Figure 1.) Any variation from the reference 
genome either causes disease (is pathogenic) or represents “normal variation” (is benign). A 
description links this aspect of the mutation with a qualification of an expert’s confidence in the 
characterization.  
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
Local systems differ in terms of the number of points along this parabola and the specific 
lexical items used to denote those points. (For example, some ‘dialects’ use the term deleterious 
in place of pathogenic.) The system most commonly used in the clinic at which I worked 
consists of a five-point scale: pathogenic variant, likely pathogenic variant, variant of uncertain 
significance (VUS), likely benign variant, and benign variant. Some laboratories recognize six 
distinct points along the parabola, and a genetic counselor told me others recognize as many as 
seven, each with finer gradations of pathogenicity and certainty.  
We can see that the system of descriptions is simultaneously the most heavily clinical and 
the most prominently epistemic of all the systems I have covered in this article. By the time 
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genetic test results are discussed in the clinic, they are presupposed to exist. That is, they are not 
under the same scrutiny as they are in the laboratory, where evidential and epistemic markers are 
used to hedge the reliability of a reported mutation’s existence in the first instance. Descriptions, 
on the other hand, use epistemic modifiers to hedge the likelihood that a given mutation causes a 
clinical condition.  
Descriptions represent a transduced version of the information presented in more 
scientist-oriented systems of nomenclature. While descriptions carry almost no content related to 
genotype (with regard neither to the genetic variant’s location nor to its form), they include 
phenotypic information. To the interpretation of the mutation they add evaluations of how the 
variant under discussion relates to the presentation of a patient’s disease.  
 
Conclusion: Expertise and the Fate of Evidence 
The Department of Medical Genetics at which I worked constitutes what Peter Galison 
calls a trading zone (Galison 1999). It is the site of exchange between laboratory scientists and 
clinicians, whose individual expertise and interactional goals differ significantly. Scientists seek 
to discover new mutations, new testing methodologies, and new forms of disease, to generalize 
that knowledge and apply it to populations. Clinicians, on the other hand, operate under a 
different regime of professional responsibility. They seek to intervene, to translate into practice 
those entities and mechanisms constructed by the scientists.  
When they encounter each other in the Department, both clinicians and scientists work 
actively to reach an understanding of the purposes of their interlocutors. In order to ‘trade,’ they 
need to know how to market their goods, to what ends they will be put, and in what form they 
will be legible. As a molecular geneticist explained, the most important thing for scientists is to 
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learn “how the [clinicians] are managing their patients on a day-to-day basis.” That knowledge 
influences what information they choose to contribute.  
The nomenclature systems presented above represent the differing concerns of their 
primary or stereotypical users. What can appear as an anarchic distribution of systems is 
explicable with a look beyond their referential function. Different systems encode different 
information in their morphology, corresponding to their users’ different social needs. As reports 
of mutations move closer to the clinic, their iterations begin to ‘reduce’ the scientific evidence 
they present. By the time a report faces non-specialist clinicians and patients, it has already been 
vetted and approved by a number of science-literate experts. The existence of the mutation is 
presupposed. Moreover, data such as test methodology and the specific location of a mutation 
within a gene are understood to be meaningless to the average clinician. This information is 
therefore removed. However, the transduction of nomenclature systems is not merely a 
simplification; it is a simultaneous incorporation of new and reformulated information relevant to 
the new audiences. For instance, as nomenclature systems move toward the clinic, they lose 
genotypic information about location and mutation type, but they also incorporate more 
phenotype-centric information such as predicted pathogenicity and information about correlated 
disorders.  
Each nomenclature system provides the act of naming with a different array of semantic 
and pragmatic potentials. The systems described above obligatorily encode certain data while 
making other information merely optional or even impossible to encode. In nomenclatures used 
primarily by scientists (such as FASTQ and VCF), epistemic markers function to qualify the 
likelihood of a mutation’s existence. In these systems, evidential markers have conventional 
implicatures of epistemic evaluation, but this is not itself semantically encoded. In fact, these 
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implicatures only emerge within the specific context of expert evaluation. The relevance of such 
a marker for the interpretation of a test result is typically lost on the average clinician, but a 
laboratory scientist can use that evidential datum to discredit the result and even remove it from 
the list of candidate mutations.  
Clinicians, on the other hand, are interested in the therapeutic relevance of a mutation. 
They have a more limited claim to scientific expertise and less of a pragmatic interest in 
genotypic information. Nomenclatures used primarily by clinicians therefore favor epistemic 
markers that qualify the likelihood that a particular mutation is the cause of a patient’s disease.  
We have seen that one of the key ways genetic nomenclature systems are distributed is 
along a scale according to whether a particular name encodes more genotypic or phenotypic 
information. I have further argued that this scale corresponds to relative expertise in laboratory 
science. The use of evidential markers correlates with the scientific competence to make 
epistemic judgments based on conventional implicatures specific to professional subcultures. 
Meanwhile, epistemic markers correlate with relative naivety in such science, relying instead on 
explicit and ready-made evaluations in order to make practical, therapeutic use of the genetic 
data that these names encode. These observations allow us to explain an otherwise random-
seeming distribution of nomenclature systems. They also point to an intrinsic relationship 
between evidential and epistemic functions of sign systems and the social and hierarchical 
contexts in which they are used. I suggest that the pragmatic role of evidential marking for 
epistemic ends is likely to be found in a variety of other contexts of expertise and 




It is difficult and not always problematic to ignore the boundaries between evidential and 
epistemic contributions of linguistic elements (e.g. Prince et al. 1982). However, important 
sociolinguistic insights can also be gained by attending to just such differences. I have presented 
an analysis of how different nomenclature systems segregate based on the professional 
responsibilities of different medical personnel. I have drawn out the variation between the 
systems in terms of the semantic and indexical content they encode and the ways that content is 
transduced and supplemented in translation between systems. By reducing the significance of 
mutation names to their referential function, much of their total meaning is lost. Instead, by 
observing how they function relative to the specific expert subcultures of their users, we discover 
that they are well-tailored and contextually contingent. 
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1 While clinicians occasionally contend that genetics is absolutely determinative of disease, they 
nearly always consider it to be at least a factor in disease’s expression. 
2 While testing is becoming increasingly common – and for many of my interlocutors, 
“mainstreaming” it as standard practice remains their goal – at the time of my fieldwork, it was 
still offered primarily in later stages of disease and in cases of more acute distress. 
3 I rely on Michael Silverstein’s definition of the term transduction throughout the paper. It is 
worth noting that this is distinct from a variety of other uses of the term in related literature, such 
as Stefan Helmreich (2007) and Stephen Black (2017), who use the word to refer to the 
conversion of sound to and from other media. Transduction is also in use in the genetics 
literature itself, referring to the transfer of genes between bacteria. My thanks go to my second 
reviewer for highlighting this potential point of confusion. 
4 The name FASTQ derives from an older format for representing nucleotide sequences, namely, 
FASTA. The Q stands for quality, as in the quality scores, which are an addition to the older 
FASTA format. 
5 In fact, most transductions between nomenclature systems are completed by computer 
programs. My interlocutors – both clinicians and scientists – are generally unaware of how 
different systems correspond. The only common transformations enacted on mutation names are 
the so-called “shorthand” forms discussed in section III, but even these represent set 
correspondences rather than active, conscious attempts at transducing between codes.  
6 dbSNP is a popular database of genetic variation run by the National Institutes of Health. 
7 These reduced forms mean, respectively, that the patient under discussion has (1) a deletion 
from the short arm (p) of chromosome 17 (associated with multiple myeloma), and (2) that the 
patient has a translocation of genetic material from chromosome 11 onto chromosome 14 
(associated with lymphoma). Both of these particular mutations are common enough that such 
reduced names are anticipated to cause no confusion among specialists in the clinic.  
8 All gene symbols are orthographically standardized (maintained by the HUGO (Human 
Genome Organization) Gene Nomenclature Committee), and most have entirely regular 
pronunciations. However, BRCA – which is one of the most commonly discussed mutations in 
the Department of Oncology – has a variety of acceptable phonological realizations. It is 
pronounced variously as [‘bɹækə], [‘bɝkə], or spelled out as [bi.ɑɹsi’eɪ], though the first 
pronunciation is the most common in the clinic at which I worked. Other symbols bear more 
limited variability. RPTOR, for instance, was most often pronounced like the word “raptor,” but 
the unapparent vowel in the first syllable was sometimes realized as [ɪ] instead. It is not obvious 
from orthography alone whether a gene symbol is spelled out or pronounced as a single word. 
HLBA, e.g., is always spelled out, but FLT3 is pronounced “flit 3.” 
9 However, many genes are multifunctional, and the first recognized role of the gene, for which it 
is named, is not necessarily its most clinically important. For instance, NRAS is named after the 
disease to which it was first linked, namely, neuroblastoma. (It gets the letters RAS because the 
gene produces Ras-type proteins, which were first discovered in a cancer-causing virus found in 
rat sarcomas.) NRAS has since, however, been most prominently implicated in a developmental 
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results. 
 
